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BASEBALL, APPLE PIE AND JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1967 WISCONSIN
SUPREME COURT RACE
MICHAEL KOEHLER1
"Certain [state] constitutions make the members of courts elected
and submit them to frequent re-elections. I dare to predict that sooner
or later these innovations will have dire results .... 2
I. INTRODUCTION
One interesting, some would say fatal, consequence of Wisconsin's
system of an elected judiciary is that judges who render decisions can be
replaced by the will of the people who tend to judge the judiciary on the
basis of a single controversial decision. A case in point is the effect that
Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.3 had on the 1967 Wisconsin
Supreme Court election between George R. Currie and Robert W.
Hansen.
In 1965, Milwaukee's major league baseball team, the Milwaukee
Braves, moved to Atlanta, Georgia, over the objection of nearly
everyone in Milwaukee and Wisconsin.4 Wisconsin's efforts to keep the
Braves in Milwaukee proved fruitless, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in a 4-3 decision held that the Braves transfer to Atlanta had not
violated Wisconsin's antitrust statutes Joining the majority in that case
was George Currie, the highly respected chief justice of the Wisconsin
1. B.A. magna cum laude, University of South Dakota, 1997; J.D. cum laude University
of Wisconsin, 2000. The author is currently an associate in the litigation department of Foley
& Lardner in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. As editor of the Wisconsin International Law Journal,
he published Two Nations, a Treaty, and the World Court, 18 WIs. INT'L LJ.287 (2000).
Additionally, the author co-authored Peanut Butter-Sandwiched Between Competing
Country of Origin Marking Requirements: An Analysis of Bestfoods v. United States, 19 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 181 (2001) with Ulice Payne, Jr.
2. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 257 (2000) (alteration in
original).
3. 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
4. BOB BUEGE, THE MILWAUKEE BRAVES: A BASEBALL EULOGY 412 (1988).
5. Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 18.
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Supreme Court.6 Standing for re-election to the high court in 1967,
Currie was defeated, in part, because his opponent, Milwaukee circuit
Judge Robert Hansen, blamed him for casting the deciding vote that
allowed the Braves to leave Milwaukee Currie's defeat not only
marked the first time in Wisconsin history that a sitting chief justice of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was removed from the bench by the
electorate, but it also cast a shadow over the wisdom of continuing
Wisconsin's system of an elected judiciary.8
II. THE ELECTION OF JUDGES IN WISCONSIN
From its infancy to the present day, Wisconsin has always had an
elected judiciary.9 By a vote of seventy-eight to twenty, delegates at the
1846 Wisconsin Constitutional Convention adopted a system of electing
judges. ° Wisconsin's adoption of an elective judiciary system was seen
as a "radical innovation" and a "pioneer step in the field of
experiment," largely because most judges had been appointed based on
the English model since the earliest days of American history.1
Wisconsin's adoption of the elective system was consistent with the
general trend of other states. In fact, every new state that entered the
Union, from Iowa in 1846 to Arizona in 1912, adopted an elective
judiciary system."2 Jacksonian Democracy was the impetus behind
Wisconsin's and other states' switch to an elective judiciary. Based on
the belief that the source of all power was the people, a central aim of
Jacksonian Democracy was the democratization of America.'
Wisconsin's system of an elected judiciary furthered this aim by giving
the citizens of Wisconsin the ability to elect candidates to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.
6. PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE: WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 1848-1998 58-59 (Trina E.
Haag ed., 1998) [hereinafter PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE].
7. Id.; Hansen Attacks Currie's Vote In Braves Case, SHEBOYGAN PRESS, Mar. 31, 1967,
§ 1, at 7 [hereinafter Hansen Attacks].
8. PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 59.
9. SUBCOMM. ON JUDGES, CITIZENS STUDY COMM. ON JUDICIAL ORG., Nov. REP., at
40-43 (1972) [hereinafter CITIZENS STUDY REPORT] ("During the early 1800's . . . the
country was swept by the wave of 'Jacksonian democracy,' the result of which was the use of
partisan elections to select almost all public officials.").
10. Nathan Heffernan, Judicial Responsibility, Judicial Independence and the Election of
Judges, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1997).
11. See CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at 40-41.
12. Id. at 41.
13. See id.; Heffernan, supra note 10, at 1036.
14. See 4 WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 59 (1998).
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However great the virtues of democracy, there were those at the
1846 constitutional convention, and there are still those today, who
criticize judicial election systems like Wisconsin's.15 Many view the
election of judges as compromising the fundamental principle of judicial
independence, which refers to the ability of a court to perform its
functions of judicial review and common and statutory law construction
without fear of retribution from the voting public." Many believe that
the mixing of courts of law and politics is a recipe for injustice.'
Recognizing such concerns, Wisconsin has attempted to insulate its
judicial election process from politics. In fact, some would argue that no
state has been as successful as Wisconsin in eliminating political
considerations from its judicial contests.1 8
Wisconsin's non-partisan judicial elections are largely the result of
the rules that govern judicial elections in Wisconsin. First, candidates
for the Wisconsin Supreme Court are nominated in non-partisan
primaries and are elected on non-partisan ballots. Second, the
Wisconsin Constitution prohibits judicial elections from occurring thirty
days before or thirty days after general partisan elections for state or
county offices.' The intent of this thirty day requirement was to
separate Wisconsin Supreme Court elections "from the excitement and
turmoil of the general election," so that the voter would give full
15. See generally CITIZEN'S STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at 43-56; Dennis Chaptman,
Process of Electing Judges Debated, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 9, 2000, available at
http:llwww.jsonine.comilnewslstateldecOO/supremelO120900a.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2001).
16. CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at 52. Former California Supreme Court
Justice Otto Kaus stated that a judge ignoring the political consequences of a highly-visible
court decision is "like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub." Julian N. Eule, Ira C.
Rothgerber, Jr. Conference on Constitutional Law: Guaranteeing, A Republican Form of
Government: Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the threat of
Electoral Reprisai 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733,739 (1994) (footnote omitted).
17. Famed legal scholar Roscoe Pound observed in 1906 that "[plutting courts into
politics, and compelling judges to become politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost
destroyed the traditional respect for the bench." Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for
Judicial Selection and Tenure: Its Historical Developmen4 7 DUQ. L. REV. 61, 64 (1968)
(quoting Pound's Address in 1906 on "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice," reprinted in 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 55,66 (1962)).
18. JOHN B. WINSLOW, THE STORY OF A GREAT COURT 385 (1912). Winslow was the
Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court from 1907 to 1920. PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE,
supra note 6, at 21.
19. See WiS. STAT. § 5.60(1)(a) (1999). The non-partisan nature of Wisconsin judicial
elections was the result of a gradual recognition by the branches of government and citizens
during the late 19th and early 20th century that the principle of non-partisanship, not party
conventions or party organization, should dominate judicial elections. See WINSLOW, supra
note 18, at 380-85.
20. See WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
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attention to the qualifications of the judicial candidates." Finally, in an
attempt to lessen the impact a particular unpopular decision may have
on a judge's chance for re-election, the Wisconsin Constitution gives
supreme court justices a ten-year term, the longest term of any elected
state official."
Despite Wisconsin's efforts to insulate judicial elections from
politics, there are still dangers inherent even in non-partisan judicial
elections like Wisconsin's. One of the disadvantages of Wisconsin's
elected judiciary is that Wisconsin judicial candidates are stripped of any
meaningful party affiliation and are generally unable to campaign on
many of the hot button political issues that resonate with the voting
public.' In addition, Wisconsin judicial candidates are further
hampered by an array of ethical prohibitions that prohibit a candidate
from engaging in political activity and from announcing in advance their
viewpoints on divisive policy issues.24 How then is a Wisconsin judicial
candidate supposed to electrify the voting public and garner votes?
Generating discussion on theories of judicial review or different
proposals for court reform would hardly seem an answer.' The end
result of Wisconsin's non-partisan judicial election system is that' in
many cases, judicial candidates are often "reduced to 'flamboyancy' for
there is little else for the public to see and understand."" One of the
most dramatic examples of such "flamboyancy" was showcased in
Wisconsin's Supreme Court election of 1967 between George Currie
and Robert Hansen. In this election, Hansen used a recent,
controversial decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to propel
himself to an unprecedented victory in Wisconsin history.
III. WISCONSIN V. MILWAUKEE BRAVES
To understand the Wisconsin Supreme Court election of 1967 and to
appreciate more fully the effect the Milwaukee Braves case had on the
1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court election, it is necessary to go back in
21. See WINSLOW, supra note 18, at 9.
22. WIS. CONST. art. VII, § 4. The original term for a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice
was six years. WINSLOW, supra note 18, at 8. In November of 1877, a constitutional
amendment increased the term to ten years. Id. at 380.
23. Heffeman, supra note 10, at 1043.
24. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUD. CoNDuCr Canon 5 (1999).
25. Heffernan speaks of prior judicial candidates attempting to stir up the electorate by
basing their campaigns on such "provocative" issues as repeal of the deadman's statute and
the problems inherent in the parole evidence rule. Heffernan, supra note 10, at 1044.
26. Id.
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time to the 1950s and early 1960s, an era in which the Milwaukee Braves
were clearly "Wisconsin's Team."27  Braves fans across the state
helplessly looked on in 1965 as the Braves played their final home
games at Milwaukee County Stadium.2 Wisconsin politicians soon came
to the rescue by persuading the state to pursue legal action against the
Braves and prevent them from leaving Milwaukee. In the end, however,
not even the courts could stop the Braves from leaving Milwaukee. In a
4-3 decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court removed the final obstacle
impeding the Braves departure from Milwaukee and in the process
closed the chapter on one of the darkest episodes in Wisconsin sports
history."
A. Wisconsin's Love Affair with the Milwaukee Braves
Much like the Green Bay Packers of the late 1990s, 31 the Milwaukee
Braves of the 1950s and early 1960s were clearly a Wisconsin institution.
Attendance at Braves games was almost a matter of "civic pride" as fans
flocked to Milwaukee County Stadium to see such stars as Hank Aaron,
Warren Spahn, and Eddie Matthews.31 As Matthews once remarked, "I
don't think any city has ever gone as crazy over a baseball team as the
city [sic] of Milwaukee did when the Braves arrived there in 1953. '
During their first full season in Milwaukee, the Braves set an all-time
National League record for attendance and, in 1954, became the first
major league team to draw over two million fans in one season.3 In the
end, however, Wisconsin's love affair with the Braves was cut short in
1964 when the Braves owners received permission from National
League owners to move the Braves to Atlanta, Georgia, to take
advantage of the booming Southern market. On September 22, 1965,
the Milwaukee Braves played their final home game at Milwaukee
County Stadium, a 7-6 loss to the Los Angeles Dodgers.5 The next day
27. See BUEGE, supra note 4, at 15-16.
28. See Robert W. Wells, Illusion Is Hard to Shake as Braves Bow Out Here,
MILWAUKEE J., Sept. 23, 1965, pt. 1, at 1.
29. See BUEGE, supra note 4, at 413.
30. See generally BOB MCGINN, THE ROAD TO GLORY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
PACKERS' SUPER BOWL XXXI CHAMPIONSHIP SEASON (1997).
31. See BUEGE, supra note 4, at 396.
32. Id. at 5. Matthews was a Hall of Fame Third Baseman who played for the
Milwaukee Braves from 1953-1965. Id. at 4,7.
33. Id. at 396.
34. Id. at 369, 393.
35. Wells, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 1; Cleon Walfoort, Braves Cheered as an Era Ends,
MILWAUKEE J., Sept. 23, 1965, pt. 2, at 16.
2001]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
a photo of a downtrodden fan appeared in the Milwaukee Journal with a
caption stating "I just feel blue[,]" which seemed to capture the
collective mood of an entire city and state.36
B. What Happened to Milwaukee Was Morally Wrong
The State of Wisconsin, Milwaukee County, and the City of
Milwaukee all tried in earnest to keep the Braves in Milwaukee and
prevent them from relocating to Atlanta." As the Braves' rumored
move to Atlanta gained legitimacy, it seemed like every "elected public
official felt duty-bound" to prevent the inevitable." Milwaukee Mayor
Henry Maier said that "what happened to Milwaukee is morally
wrong."39 Milwaukee County Board Chairman, Eugene Grobschmidt,
even suggested that someone was "trying to make the team look bad for
Milwaukee."'" A team of elected officials including United States
Congressman Henry Reuss threatened the possibility of an antitrust
action against the Braves and Major League Baseball as a way of
keeping the Braves in Milwaukee.4
In the end, litigation did ensue, and the State of Wisconsin alleged in
state circuit court that the Braves, the National League, and the
corporate owners of the individual teams of the National League had
violated Wisconsin antitrust laws.42
C. Wisconsin's Failed Attempt to keep the Braves in Milwaukee
The State alleged in its complaint that the Braves and other National
League teams held a monopoly in the field of major league baseball and
that they agreed to shut down baseball in Milwaukee in restraint of
trade and commerce and thus violated Wisconsin's antitrust statutes.43
The State sought monetary damages, a restraining order preventing the
Braves' move to Atlanta, and a permanent injunction- requiring the
Braves and the National League to grant a new franchise to Milwaukee
36. Wells, supra note 28, pt. 1, at 1.
37. BUEGE, supra note 4, at 369-70.
38. Id. at 369.
39. Case Is Far From Over-LaFollette, MILWAUKEE J., Jul. 27, 1966, pt. 1, at 3.
40. BUEGE, supra note 4, at 370.
41. Id. at 369.
42. Id. at 392; See also Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., No. 65-C-225, 1965 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9542, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 9, 1965) (granting motion to remand from federal to
state court).
43. See Milwaukee Braves, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9542, at *1.
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or permit the purchase of the Braves by local interests.' "On April 13,
1966, while the new Atlanta Braves were playing [baseball] in their most
recent home" of Atlanta, Circuit Judge Elmer. W. Roller rendered his
decision.45 In a 176 page opinion, Judge Roller concluded that the
"Braves and the National League had violated Wisconsin's antitrust
laws and must either: (1) give Milwaukee a major league franchise
through expansion in 1967, or 2) return the Braves to Milwaukee.""
One court observer noted that in making his decision, Judge Roller
"saved a lot of lives" because "if he had ruled the other way, a lot of
people might have died of shock."47 Judge Roller's decision, of course,
did not immediately return the Braves to Milwaukee, rather,
Wisconsin's crusade to keep the Braves in Milwaukee shifted to a
different playing field as the Braves and the National League appealed
Judge Roller's decision to the Wisconsin Supreme Court."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court sympathized with the State by noting
that the Braves and the National League "gave little heed to the
interests of the Milwaukee community, and to the injury [which would
result from the Braves leaving Milwaukee and Wisconsin.]"'49 Further,
the court found that the Braves and the National League had in fact
agreed to restrain trade and commerce in violation of Wisconsin's
antitrust statutes.0 However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Fairchild and joined by Chief Justice Currie,
Justice Myron Gordon, and Justice Horace Wilkie, held that
Wisconsin's antitrust statutes did not apply to the Braves and the
National League because baseball's federal antitrust exemption
extended to all decisions concerning league structure and organization.5'
The issue before the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Braves litigation
was as much a question of the proper application of the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution as it was about Wisconsin's
antitrust statutes. In its opinion, the court traced the peculiar history of
baseball's judge-made exemption from the federal antitrust laws first
articulated in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of
44. Id. at *13--*14.
45. BUEGE, supra note 4, at 412.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 413.
49. Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 1,18 (Wis. 1966).
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 17-18.
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Professional Baseball Clubs. 2 This exemption was affirmed in Toolson
v. New York Yankees,53 and the court further noted that the prevailing
federal policy seemed to approve of the existing structure in organized
baseball.' Therefore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that
because of the requirements of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, Wisconsin's antitrust statutes could not be applied to the
"concerted action" by the Braves and the National League in moving
the team from Milwaukee to Atlanta.55
By all accounts it seemed like the Wisconsin Supreme Court made a
correct, albeit unpopular, decision in the Milwaukee Braves case.
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, speaking at the inaugural
Thomas E. Fairchild Lecture at the University of Wisconsin Law School
in 1989, recognized the difficulty of the Braves case and praised the
majority opinion. 6 Justice Stevens remarked that "the cynic is likely to
assume that judges who must periodically stand for reelection will have
a tendency to find that the result that is overwhelmingly favored by their
outraged constituents is also the result that the law commands. But that
did not happen in the Braves' litigation."'" Justice Stevens added that
"[a] baseball fan has every right to voice his or her prejudices in or out
of the ball park, but there is no room for intolerance in the chambers of
the wise appellate judge. ""
The State appealed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court to
the United States Supreme Court. 9 However, by a 4 to 3 vote, the
United States Supreme Court refused to hear the State's appeal,6 thus
slamming the door on Wisconsin's efforts to keep the Braves in
Milwaukee. Despite being dead in the courts, the Braves case did not
fade from public consciousness as it was quickly resurrected in the 1967
election for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
IV. THE 1967 WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ELECrION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court election of 1967 was the first judicial
52. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
53. 346 U.S. 356 (1956).
54. See Milwaukee Braves, 144 N.W.2d at 14.
55. Id. at 18.
56. Justice John Paul Stevens, A Judge's Use of History-Thomas E. Fairchild Inaugural
Lecture, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 223,225 (1989).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 227.
59. High Court Refuses Rehearing on Braves, MILWAUKEE J., Jan. 23, 1967, pt. 1, at 1.
60. Id.; Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, 385 U.S. 990 (1966) (denying writ of certiori).
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election after the Wisconsin Supreme Court's controversial decision in
the Braves case. In the election, an opportunistic candidate seized upon
the public's dissatisfaction with the Braves case by blaming his opponent
for authorizing the Braves departure from Milwaukee.1 What followed
was both shocking and significant. It was shocking because for the first
time in Wisconsin history, a sitting chief justice of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was removed from the bench by the electorate. It was
significant because the election cast a shadow over the wisdom of
continuing Wisconsin's established system of an elected judiciary.
A. The Candidates
A native of Princeton, Wisconsin, George Currie attended the
University of Wisconsin Law School (UW).62 At the UW, Currie served
as the Editor in Chief of the Wisconsin Law Review, was inducted into
the Order of the Coif and graduated at the top of his class in 1925.6
After practicing corporate law in Sheboygan, Wisconsin for 26 years,
Currie was appointed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1951 by
Governor Walter Kohler and became chief justice of the court in 1964.6
What Currie lacked in charm and charisma, he made up in intellect and
character. While on the court, Currie quickly positioned himself as one
of the great common law judges in the United States earning high marks
for legal scholarship, court administration, and judicial integrity.6'
Fellow Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Nathan Heffernan once
remarked that several nationally recognized jurists such as Roger
Traynor of California and Frank Kennison of New Hampshire would
come up to him at judicial meetings and comment on just "how
fortunate [he] was to be a colleague" of Currie's.6
A native of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Robert Hansen graduated from
Marquette University Law School in 1933 where he excelled in debate
and served as the Editor in Chief of the Marquette Law Review.67 After
a brief stint in private practice, Hansen was appointed to the Milwaukee
61. See Hansen Attacks, supra note 7, § 1, at 7.
62. PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 58.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Heffeman, supra note 10, at 1031, 1033.
67. Eldon Knoche, Hansen, Former State Justice, Remembered for Eloquence,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 10, 1997, at 7B. Ex-colleague Shirley Abrahamson, Chief
Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, stated that Hanson: "loved law and loved to discuss
it." Id.
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District Court by Governor Walter Kohler in 1954.6 Thereafter,
Hansen gained expertise in the fields of family and administrative law as
the senior judge of Milwaukee's Family Court, a division of the circuit
court that handled divorce and domestic relations cases.69 Hansen was
actively involved in the Fraternal Order of the Eagles and became the
only man at the time to have been elected twice as president of the
organization.0 Intelligent, eloquent, and humorous, Hansen was a
seasoned campaigner and well-connected politically.
B. The Issues and the Role the Milwaukee Braves Case Had on the 1967
Wisconsin Supreme Court Election
The Milwaukee Braves case was the most dramatic issue in the 1967
Wisconsin Supreme Court election; however, Wisconsin voters faced
other issues during the election besides the Braves case. First, Chief
Justice Currie's age-sixty-seven-was an issue.7  Hansen and his
supporters pointed out that if re-elected, Currie would be able to serve
only two years and one month of his ten-year term before Wisconsin's
constitutionally mandated judicial retirement age of seventy would force
Currie to step down.' Currie, himself, considered the chief justice's age
and experience an advantage, pointing out that if he would retire while
still on the bench, the Wisconsin Constitution would allow him to
continue to serve the State as a reserve circuit judge.' In addition,
fellow Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Thomas E. Fairchild also
considered Currie's age and experience an advantage during the
election. At a midwinter meeting of the Wisconsin State Bar
Association, Fairchild commented to fellow bar members that "[i]t
would be foolish to defeat a good man and thus prevent him from
retiring and becoming eligible to serve as a reserve judge."74
A second issue in the 1967 Supreme Court election was the interplay
between a proposed judicial code of ethics and Hansen's membership
with the Eagles.7" Rule 14 of the proposed code, which Currie allegedly
supported, required that a judge not "be a member or participate in the
68. Id.
69. See PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 70.
70. See Knoche, supra note 67, at 7B.
71. See Charles J. Kelley, Major Issue in Campaign? 'My Record,' Currie Says,
SHEBOYGAN PRESS, Mar. 28, 1967, § 1, at 4; PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 59.
72. See Kelley, supra note 71, § 1, at 4.
73. Id.
74. Currie Paid Tribute at Fete for Fairchild, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 18, 1967, pt.1, at 6.
75. See Kelley, supra note 71, § 1, at 4.
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affairs of any group whose activities are inconsistent . . . with the
impartial exercise of his judicial duties."76 As a result of the proposed
code, several Wisconsin judges resigned their membership in the Eagles
Club on the grounds that their judicial oaths conflicted with the
fraternal organization's all-white membership policy.' Hansen, on the
other hand, was strongly opposed to the proposed code of judicial ethics
and refused to resign from the Eagles.' Hansen remarked that if he had
to choose between being a judge and belonging to the Eagles he would
choose the latter.79 Hansen's refusal to disassociate himself from the
Eagles did cost him the endorsement of the AFL-CIO's Committee on
Political Education (COPE), despite the fact that before becoming a
judge, Hansen represented close to fifteen AFL-CIO unions.'
1. If the Judiciary Will Not Rectify This Injustice, Then the People Must
The issues of age, the judicial code, and the Eagles Club aside,
clearly the most controversial issue during the 1967 supreme court
election, and the issue that is most discussed and cited as affecting the
supreme court election of 1967, was the Braves case. Nearly two years
had passed since the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Justice Currie included,
ruled that Wisconsin's antitrust statutes could not be used to keep the
Braves in Milwaukee. However, Wisconsin voters were still
understandably angry and confused about the Braves departure, and the
case still struck an emotional cord with the voters. Adding fuel to this
emotional flame was the rhetoric of Wisconsin's Attorney General,
Bronson La Follette. Referring to the Braves case, La Follette said that
the "citizens of our state and people throughout the country are, and
should be, aroused at the injustice of this judicial determination.""8 In a
challenge to voters, La Follette remarked: "If the judiciary cannot or
will not rectify this injustice, then the people and their elected
representatives must. "2
From the outset of the 1967 supreme court election, several factors
76. Bar Urges High Court to Air Judicial Code, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 16, 1967, pt. 2, at 4.
77. See, e.g., Edward S. Kerstein, Judges Argue with Policy, 'Publicity Trick' Charged,
MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 5, 1967, pt. 2, at 1 (detailing plight of Circuit Court Judge Michael
Sullivan after resigning from the Eagles Club).
78. See Kelley, supra note 71, § 1, at 4; Leon Hughes, COPE Won't Back Hansen,
MILWAUKEE J., Jan. 19,1967, pt. 2, at 1.
79. Hughes, supra note 78, pt. 2, at 1.
80. Id.
81. La Follette Deplores Braves Case Rebuff, MILWAUKEE J., Jan. 24, 1967, at 5.
82. Id.
2001]
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
seemed to indicate that Currie would be invincible and easily retain his
seat on the court for another term. First, Currie was the incumbent
candidate and an imminent jurist on one of the top state supreme courts
in the country.' Second, nearly every Wisconsin newspaper that had
taken a stand in the election had endorsed Currie.' Third, a remarkable
outpouring of top leadership in the state rallied around Currie, including
retired Wisconsin Supreme Court Justices Timothy Brown and John
Martin who remarked that Currie's accomplishments "mark him as one
of the most outstanding leaders in the court's history." '  Fourth, the
influential Milwaukee Bar Association's judicial qualification poll gave
Currie a qualification rating of 97.8% compared to Hansen's 75.6%."
Finally, it seemed that Currie's participation in the Braves case would
not be an issue in the election. In fact, Hansen, prompted by a
reporter's question about the Braves case, commented that he "did not
think that a judge who did not hear the case or arguments of council
should comment on the decision of the judge or judges who tried the
case."87
Such factors propelled Currie to a March 7, 1967 statewide primary
victory over Hansen and a third candidate, Harry Halloway." Despite
winning the primary, however, Currie' s aura of invincibility was dealt a
serious blow because of the closeness of the primary vote; Currie
defeated Hansen by a margin of 91,691 to 90,539 in the primary.' The
size of Hansen's vote, his strength outside the Milwaukee area, and the
83. See PORTRAITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 59.
84. A sampling of what Wisconsin's leading newspapers had to say about Currie:
"[Currie has] demonstrated qualities of leadership [and] long service" (FOND DU LAC
COMMONWEALTH REPORTER); "[Currie] is respected as a legal scholar [and] a man of
diligence, scholarship and integrity" (MILWAUKEE SENTINEL); "[Currie was the] ablest
student in his class at the University of Wisconsin law school, an esteemed lawyer"
(MILWAUKEE JOURNAL); "[Currie is] one of the finest and most able.., an outstanding
background" (SHEBOYGAN PRESS). Re-Elect our Chief Justice, WiS. STATE. J., Apr. 3, 1967,
§ 1, at 5 (advertisement).
85. On, Wisconsin: Chief Justice Currie is Recommended for Reelection, MILWAUKEE J.,
Mar. 26, 1967, pt. 1, at 1. Others who had supported Currie included former Wisconsin
Governor Walter Kohler, Attorney General Bronson La Follette, Wisconsin State Bar
President, Ray McCann, and Wisconsin AFL-CIO President, John Schmitt. Paid
Advertisement, MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 2,1967, at 5.
86. Edward S. Kerstein, Bar Lauds Currie, Duffy Not Backed, MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 26,
1967, pt. 1, at 1.
87. Edward S. Kerstein, 2 Opponents to Test Justice Currie as Vote Getter, MILWAUKEE
J., Feb. 14, 1967, pt. 3, at 3.
88. Thomas G. Lubenow, Currie, Hansen Win In Close Court Race, MILWAUKEE J.,
Mar. 8, 1967, pt. 1, at 1.
89. Id.
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closeness of the race were all unforeseen and led many to believe that
Currie was in danger of being defeated in the general election in April
of 1967.' With Currie's invincibility tarnished and Hansen sensing a
legitimate shot at victory in the general election, Hansen and his
supporters launched a more aggressive and extensive campaign against
Currie. A centerpiece of this new and aggressive campaign strategy was
an attempt by Hansen to rekindle the emotional flames of Milwaukee
and Wisconsin baseball fans by blaming Currie for the Braves'
departure from Milwaukee.9
2. The People Always Seem to Lose the Close Ones.
One week before the April 4, 1967 election, Hansen, despite his
prior campaign promise not to make the Braves case an issue in the
election, claimed in a campaign speech and press release that Currie cast
the deciding vote in the Braves case.92 Hansen said that "[w]hat
happened in the Braves' case was a judicial abdication of our state's
rights to enforce its antitrust laws against a violator." 93 Further, in a
statement sure to stir up the electorate, Hansen referred to the Braves
case and proclaimed that the "people always seem to lose the close
ones."94 Throughout the campaign, Currie sought to display his vast
judicial experience by reminding voters that he authored nearly 600
opinions and participated in nearly 4000 decisions during his fifteen plus
years on the court." Yet, Hansen used Currie's experience on the bench
as justification for using the Braves case against the Chief Justice saying
that "when you take credit for a whole barrel of apples, you cannot
expect that a bad apple in the barrel will be overlooked."96
The propriety of Hansen's use of the Braves case against Currie was
questioned by many. Currie was well aware that the Braves case might
be used against him in the election." With each new Braves attack,
Currie was put in a precarious position: on the one hand, publicly
responding to Hansen's Braves attack might be viewed by some as
90. Id.
91. See Hansen Attacks, supra note 7, § 1, at 7.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Issue Finally Raised in Supreme Court Race: Hansen Raps Currie on Braves Decision,
WiS. STATE J., Apr. 2, 1967, § 1, at 8 [hereinafter Hansen Raps Currie].
95. See Kelley, supra note 71, § 1, at 4.
96. Edward S. Kerstein, Hansen Wins High Court Post, MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 5, 1967, pt.
1, at 14.
97. See Kelley, supra note 71, § 1, at 4
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legitimizing them, while on the other hand not saying anything at all
might be viewed by some as tantamount to an admission that Currie did
in fact cast the deciding vote that allowed the Braves to leave
Milwaukee. In the end, Currie chose the latter and refused to talk
further about the Braves case, believing that any so called backlash from
the Braves case was not an issue in the campaign. 9'
Currie firmly believed that the only issue in the election was
"whether a judge or justice who has given good, conscientious service
should be returned to office by the voters."" Currie did acknowledge
that a good judge must never be indifferent to the needs and concerns of
the people but stressed, perhaps in reference to the Braves case, that a
good judge must equally "be indifferent as to whether his decisions will
win for him the people's acclaim or their condemnation."'0' Currie
supporters openly criticized Hansen's use of the Braves case as foolish.
They pointed out that the seven justices on the Wisconsin Supreme
Court meet behind closed doors when they vote, and that it was
impossible to know if Currie cast the deciding vote in the Braves case
because no one could possibly know which justice voted first or last.'0'
Even the Milwaukee Journal sharply criticized Hansen for campaigning
opportunistically, unethically, and "using tactics that approach
disgraceful." 02 The Milwaukee Journal chastised Hansen for implying
that "local loyalty and not law should dictate the rulings of a supreme
court justice."" Privately, some of Hansen's backers even questioned
the propriety of Hansen's attacks on Currie regarding the Braves case."°
3. Issue Finally Raised in Supreme Court Race
What is interesting about judicial elections is that they are
remarkably uninteresting contests generally forced upon an apathetic
voting public. However, the Braves issue seemed to resonate through
98. Id.
99. Thomas G. Lubenow, High Court Issues: Age, Eagles, Press, MILWAUKEE J., Mar.
26, 1967, pt. 2, at 1.
100. 560 Attend Dinner For Currie, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 20, 1967, pt. 1, at 8 [hereinafter
Dinner for Currie].
101. Currie Attacked for Braves Case, Wis. STATE J., Mar. 31, 1967, § 1, at 6.
102. Shocking Campaign Tactics in Supreme Court Race, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 30, 1967,
pt. 1, at 16. The Milwaukee Journal pointed out that during the 1964 Wisconsin Supreme
Court election, the court censured a candidate who did "exactly what Hansen was doing [to
Currie]-citicizing a justice for a court opinion." Id.
103. Id.
104. Edward S. Kerstein, Tuesday Forecast: Only 25% to Vote, MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 2,
1967, pt. 2, at 1.
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the entire state during the spring of 1967 and dramatized an otherwise
colorless and issueless supreme court campaign. In fact, after Hansen's
attacks on Currie, the Wisconsin State Journal ran the headline: "'Issue'
Finally Raised in Supreme Court Race: Hansen Raps Currie on BravesDecision. "'0'
It seemed like everyone, not just the candidates and their closest
supporters, had an opinion on the Braves case and its proper role in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court election of 1967. For instance, former
Milwaukee Braves players were active in urging Currie's defeat. 6
Weeks before the election, former Braves players Johnny Logan and
Eddie Matthews filed papers with the Wisconsin Secretary of State's
office forming the Braves for Judge Bob Hansen Committee.Y Likewise,
Currie received some unlikely support in the days leading up to the
election." Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson La Follette, the same
Bronson La Follette who championed the state's cause during the
course of the Braves litigation and urged all citizens to become aroused
at the "injustice of [the] judicial determination" in the Braves case,"°
urged his fellow citizens to vote for Currie in the upcoming election.1
La Follette acknowledged that he had not always agreed with "Currie's
interpretation of the law[;]" however, he never doubted that Currie's
decisions "were arrived at only after careful, honest and diligent
consideration .... without regard to the effect they might have on his
chances for re-election."'' According to La Follette, "[u]nder an
elective judicial process, this must be the prime criteria for gauging a
judge's integrity.""'
C. The Outcome
On Tuesday, April 4, 1967, Wisconsin voters went to the polls to
elect a justice to the Wisconsin Supreme Court."3  The campaign
speeches were finished, the allegations had been made, and the choices
were clear: George Currie or Robert Hansen. However, because of the
105. See Hanen Raps Currie, supra note 94, § 1, at 8.
106. See Kerstein, supra note 104, pt. 2, at 10.
107. Id.
108. Atty. Gen. LaFollette Backs Justice Currie, SHEBOYGAN PRESS, Mar. 29, 1967, § 1,
at 3 [hereinafter LaFollette Backs Currie].
109. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
110. LaFollette Backs Currie, supra note 108, § 1, at 3.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Kerstein, supra note 96, pt. 1, at 1.
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issues raised and the strategies employed, the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme
Court race definitely was not an ordinary judicial race. For this reason,
many observers felt that, beyond the mere exercise of electing another
justice to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme
Court race represented, in a much broader sense, a referendum on
Wisconsin's judicial election system."' It was even said that the
"integrity of the judicial election process [was] on trial... in Wisconsin"
and that the defeat of Chief Justice Currie "would deal a sharp blow to
the principle of an independent judiciary... in Wisconsin.'
The results of the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court election were
shocking. By a margin of 479,117 to 377,426, Robert Hansen had
defeated Chief Justice George Currie. 6 Currie was gracious in defeat
remarking in his concession speech that in a democracy "one who is a
candidate for public office should cheerfully accept the decision of the
voters in defeat as well as in victory.', 17 Currie's defeat not only marked
the third time in Wisconsin history that a sitting Wisconsin Supreme
Court justice was defeated at the polls,"8 but more importantly, his
defeat represented the first time in Wisconsin history that a sitting chief
justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was removed from the bench by
the electorate."9  In a much broader sense, Currie's defeat was
significant because it cast a shadow over the wisdom of continuing
Wisconsin's system of an elected judiciary.
V. THE 1967 WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT ELECTION IN CONTEXT
Dissatisfaction with Wisconsin's elected judiciary system was
growing even before Currie's unexpected defeat by Hansen in 1967.
Like the 1967 supreme court election, two previous Wisconsin Supreme
Court elections were marred by controversy and calls for reform. In
both of these elections, the challenging candidate, like Hansen in 1967,
114. See Dinner for Currie, supra note 100, pt. 1, at 8 (Judge John W. Reynolds stated
"[i]f the judicial system rejects a chief justice for no outstanding reason ... then that judicial
system has failed.").
115. LaFollette Backs Currie, supra note 108, §1, at 3.
116. WIS. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 1968, at 757 (1968).
117. Kerstein, supra note 96, pt. 1, at 1.
118. The other two supreme court justices defeated at the polls were James Ward Rector
and Emmert Wingert. Heffernan, supra note 10, at 1036-37. Rector, after serving an initial
appointment lasting less than two years, was defeated in 1946 by Henry Hughes. Id. at 1036.
Wingert, "after serving only a twenty-eight month appointment, was defeated in 1958 by
William Dietrich." Id. at 1036-37.
119. Kerstein, supra note 96, pt. 1, at 1.
120. See infra Part V.A-B.
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was criticized for using a single controversial decision by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in an effort to stimulate the voting public and defeat an
incumbent justice.
A. The 1964 Wisconsin Supreme Court Election: Wilkie v. Boyle
In many ways, the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court election was a
replay of the 1964 Wisconsin Supreme Court election. Like Currie,
incumbent Justice Horace H. Wilkie in 1964 was the overwhelming
favorite to win another term on the high court and secured the support
of nearly every major Wisconsin public official and newspaper." Like
Hansen, challenger Howard H. Boyle, Jr. ran an aggressive campaign
and assailed his opponent for a vote on a single, controversial case.'3
The controversial case at issue in the 1964 Wisconsin Supreme Court
election was the Tropic of Cancer24 case. In that case, Justice Wilkie
voted with the majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in holding that
Henry Miller's novel, The Tropic of Cancer,"z was not obscene. 6
Boyle made the Tropic of Cancer case the battle cry of his campaign
hoping that the decision was sufficiently unpopular with the voting
public to affect the results of the Wisconsin Supreme Court election."
Boyle claimed that the court's decision in the Tropic of Cancer opened
the door to pornography in Wisconsin and boldly proclaimed that a vote
for him was a "Vote Against Smut."'" Unlike Currie, Wilkie
aggressively defended his decision in the Tropic of Cancer case, insisting
"that pornography was not the issue" in the supreme court's decision
and asserting that the supreme court's ruling "affirmed the right of free
expression" and followed the constitutional test for obscenity
established by the United States Supreme Court. 9 Wilkie believed that
nothing was more important to Wisconsin courts than the
121. See infra notes 123-28, 141-43 and accompanying text.
122. See Supreme Court Race Revolves on 'Tropic,' MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 5, 1964, pt. 2,
at 2 [hereinafter Race Revolves].
123. Id.
124. McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 121 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. 1963).
125. HENRY MILLER, TROPIC OF CANCER (1961). The Tropic of Cancer is about a poor
American artist "living in Paris in the depression years about 1930." McCauley, 121 N.W.2d
at 551. With little money and no permanent place to live, the character in the book drifts
around Paris engaging in "frequent and casual sex experiences" with, among others,
prostitutes and victims of venereal diseases. Id.
126. McCauley, 121 N.W.2d at 554.
127. See Race Revolves, supra note 122, pt. 2, at 2.
128. Turnout of Million Possible in Election, MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 5, 1964, pt. 1, at 1.
129. Race Revolves, supra note 122, pt. 2, at 2.
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"independence of judges" and asserted: "The integrity and
independence of Wisconsin's judicial system would be endangered if the
election of a judge were based on the momentary popularity of a
decision. ,13'
Boyle's campaign tactics did receive some support, most notably
from the Green Bay Catholic Archdiocese;131  however, the
overwhelming public reaction to Boyle's tactics was highly critical. Six
of Justice Wilkie's colleagues on the court, including Justice Currie,
publicly rebuked Boyle for using campaign tactics that "blatantly
cater[ed] to prejudice" and "utterly lack[ed] the essential quality of
judicial mind and temperament." 2  The Milwaukee Junior Bar
Association went a step further, censuring Boyle for what it saw as a
"clear and direct violation of canon 30 of the canons of judicial ethics"
and "a threat to the independence and integrity of judges everywhere
and to our whole judicial system."' The Milwaukee Journal was
equally critical of Boyle's tactics, saying that his attack on Wilkie
implied that Boyle would set aside "law and legal precedent" to reach
the popular decision, and that these were "highly questionable tactics
for a judicial candidate. "'M
In the end, Wilkie, unlike Currie, defeated his challenger by a
margin of 556,639 to 489,703.35 Wilkie's victory was termed "a
heartwarming victory for the cause of a sound and independent
judiciary. '136  Concern, however, was raised by the small margin of
Wilkie's victory, the challenge it posed to Wisconsin's judicial election
system, and to the notion of an independent judiciary in Wisconsin.137
To many, Wilkie's close call "showed [that] too many people still [were]
not upholding the principle that justice must not be intimidated by fear
130. Candidates' Qualities Termed Lone Issue, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 26, 1964, pt. 2, at
14.
131. Race Revolves, supra note 122, pt. 2, at 2.
132. Justices Rebuke Candidate, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 26, 1964, pt. 1, at 16. The only
justice that did not publicly rebuke Boyle was Justice Harold Hallow. Six Justices Scold
Boyle, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 24, 1964, pt. 3, at 1. Hallow's refusal was based entirely on his
belief that it was inappropriate for the court to defend a decision in public. Id.
133. Junior Bar Censures Boyle for Attacking 'Tropic' Ruling, MILWAUKEE J., Mar. 21,
1964, pt. 1, at 1.
134. Milwaukee: Why Wilkie Should Be Returned to High Court, MILWAUKEE J., Mar.
31, 1964, pt. 1, at 1.
135. WIs. LEGIS. REFERENCE BUREAU, WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 1966, at 817 (1966)
[hereinafter 1966 BLUE BOOK].
136. Justice Wilkie's Victory, MILWAUKEE J., Apr. 8, 1964, pt. 1, at 20.
137. See id.
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of popular emotions over conscientious decisions.""
B. The 1965 Wisconsin Supreme Court Election: Heffernan v. Boyle
A single controversial case decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
was also a major issue in the 1965 Wisconsin Supreme Court election."'
The 1965 election cast the same Howard Boyle, fresh from his defeat by
Justice Wilkie in 1964, against incumbent Justice Nathan S. Heffernan."4
Like the 1964 election, Boyle again challenged his opponent for his
participation in the Tropic of Cancer case; however, he had a new case
in his 1965 campaign arsenal.4  In Barnes v. Wisconsin, Justice
Heffernan voted with the majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
setting aside the conviction of a known drug user for possession of
marijuana, on the grounds that the search, which revealed the drugs, was
unreasonable. 2  Boyle assailed Heffernan and the court for its
"ultraliberal" bent. 3 However, the Barnes case, unlike the Tropic of
Cancer case a year earlier, did not garner much media attention or
resonate with the public, and therefore seemed to have a negligible
affect on the 1965 Wisconsin Supreme Court election. The 1965 election
saw Heffernan defeat Boyle 376,000 to 362,604 in a very low voter
turnout.'"
Nevertheless, many followers of the court were concerned with what
seemed to be an emerging trend in Wisconsin judicial elections: the
frequency with which controversial decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court were becoming issues in judicial election campaigns.4 5 In fact,
many of these same people were cautiously holding their breath in
anticipation of the 1966 Wisconsin Supreme Court election when Justice
Thomas E. Fairchild, the author of the Tropic of Cancer decision, was
up for re-election.' 6 However, Justice Fairchild ran for the court
unopposed and concern turned to relief over the absence of
138. Id.
139. See Jack Ladinsky & Allan Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial Independence:
Electorate and Elite Reactions to Two Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections, 1967 WIs. L. REv.
128,153-54 (1967).
140. Id. at 151.
141. Id. at 153-54.
142. 130 N.W.2d 264,269 (Wis. 1964).
143. See Ladinsky & Silver, supra note 139, at 152.
144. See 1966 BLuE BOOK, supra note 135, at 819.
145. See Ladinsky & Silver, supra note 139, at 154.
146. Id.
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controversy.'47 Thus, it seemed like the disturbing trend had been
reversed.' Writing in the Spring of 1966, Jack Ladinsky commented:
"Normality had been restored to judicial politics.',19 However, as the
1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court election demonstrated, such
"normality" was short lived.
The exact influence the Braves case had on individual voter
decisions in the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court election will never be
known. However, it is safe to assume, by all accounts, that the Braves
case and Hansen's campaign tactics did have some effect on voter
decisions in the election. Even Hansen himself was willing to concede a
day after his election victory that the Braves case, at the very least, may
have been a factor in determining the outcome of the election."' Many
people were alarmed and concerned that a single controversial
Wisconsin Supreme Court case had yet again played a role in a
Wisconsin judicial election.151 Dissatisfaction with Wisconsin's judicial
election system had reached a pinnacle, and it seemed like the 1967
Wisconsin Supreme Court election was the proverbial "straw that broke
the camel's back." Wisconsin's system of judicial selection was ripe for
reform.
VI. THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1967 WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
ELECTION: THE CITIZENS STUDY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL
ORGANIZATION
An enduring legacy of Wisconsin's 1967 Supreme Court election is
that it contributed to the formation of a citizen led judicial reform
movement. In 1971, The Citizens Study Committee on Judicial
Organization (the "Committee") was formed to embark on a
comprehensive study of Wisconsin's judicial system and make
recommendations for its improvement.' One of the more important
tasks undertaken by the Committee was an analysis of Wisconsin's
judicial election system."' After months of gathering information and
hearing testimony, the Committee recommended that Wisconsin abolish
147. Id
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Hansen to Fight 'Lawmaking,' Wis. STATE J., Apr. 6, 1967, § 1, at 10.
151. See Heffernan, supra note 10, at 1033-34 (stating that the 1967 election "cast a pall
over the wisdom of continuing the elctive system for the judiciary and was a principal factor
in the [citizen] Committee's [recommendations]"); CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9.
152. CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at i.
153. Id. at 1.
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its elective system of selecting judges and replace it with a merit based
appointment system."5 Justice Currie's defeat in the 1967 Wisconsin
Supreme Court election was a principle factor in the Committee's
decision.15
A. Formation of the Committee
During the State of the Judiciary speech on January 13, 1971, the
Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, E. Harold Hallows,
suggested the creation of a blue ribbon committee made up of non-
judges in Wisconsin "to look into the problems confronting the
Wisconsin judicial system."'56 Following the suggestion of the Chief
Justice, Wisconsin Governor Patrick J. Lucey signed Executive Order 13
on April 23, 1971, creating the forty-member Committee whose task was
to "recommend changes in the judiciary so that we might better insure
that all individuals have their rights protected-in an efficient and just
manner."' The scope of the Governor's instructions to the Committee
was so broad that it was one of the "biggest reorganization[s] in the
history of state courts."'58 Issues to be considered by the Committee
included court organization, such as the wisdom of establishing a court
of appeals and a single level trial court, court procedures, and judicial
selection.59 Although judicial selection was just one of a myriad of
issues facing the Committee, it was one of the most important."
B. The Issue of Judicial Selection
Given the controversy surrounding the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme
Court election, it surprised few that the topic of judicial selection
154. Id. at 56.
155. Id. at 57. Although not explicitly stating that the 1967 election was a principle
factor in the Committee's recommendations, the Committee's focus on limiting the influence
of outside pressure, and therefore heightening the importance of an individual's merits, shows
the impact of the election. Id. at 52-53.
156. Id. at L
157. Id.
158. William Janz, Appointed Judges Urged By Panel, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Nov. 11,
1972, pt. 1, at 1.
159. See email from Shirley Abrahamson, Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and key member of the committee, to Mike Koehler (April 20,2000) (on file with author).
160. Jeffrey Bartel, counselor and administrator for the Committee, remarked that the
manner in which we select our judges was "by far the most significant" issue facing the
Committee. Elizabeth Gall, Picking Judges on a Merit Basis, TWIN-CITY NEWS REc., Nov.
17,1972, at 1.
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appeared on the Committee agenda.161 The Charge and Instructions to
the Judges Subcommittee (the "Subcommittee"), one of five standing
subcommittees established by the Committee, impressed upon its
members the monumental task ahead, proclaiming that "[n]o element of
our courts is more important than the judges who staff them, for they
are the central figures in the administration of justice.162 The
Subcommittee recognized that the method by which judges are selected
in Wisconsin had an impact on the quality of the Wisconsin judiciary
and the public's confidence in the judiciary to remain independent from
outside influences." Thus, the ultimate goal of the Subcommittee was
to survey the many different proposals for the selection of judges and to
recommend a judicial selection system that would "make it possible for
the best qualified men to ascend the bench and remain there."'1
It soon became obvious to the Committee that Wisconsin's current
non-partisan judicial election system was not the method that "[made] it
possible for the best qualified men to ascend the bench and remain
there. '' Leading the effort to abandon Wisconsin's judicial election
system was Chief Justice Hallows of the Wisconsin Supreme Court who
first suggested the establishment of the Committee "to look into the
problems confronting the Wisconsin judicial system."' 66 In testimony
before the Subcommittee, Hallows said that Wisconsin's current judicial
selection scheme "is the least desirable method of attaining the goal of a
strong and independent and competent judiciary .... and does little to
insure the selection of the best qualified candidate."' 67 The final report
of the Committee (the "Report") echoed the complaints of Hallows and
others regarding Wisconsin's judicial election system. 61 Specifically, the
first sentence of the Report clearly expressed the frustration members
161. See CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.
162. CHARGE AND INSTRUCTIONS TO JUDGES SUBCOMMITTEE 1 (1971) [hereinafter
CHARGES AND INSTRUCTIONS]. A full collection of documents relating to the Citizens Study
Committee on Judicial Organization are on file at the Wisconsin State Historical Society:
Series 2557.
163. CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at 39. The full Committee adopted
verbatim the report of the Judges Subcommittee by a vote of 27-4. Therefore, the terms
"Subcommittee" and "Committee" are used synonymously hereinafter unless otherwise
indicated.
164. CHARGE AND INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 162.
165. Id.
166. CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at i.
167. See CITIZENS STUDY COMMITrEE ON JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION, SUMMARY
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS, May 15-16, 1972, at 14 [hereinafter SUMMARY TRANSCRIPT].
168. See CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at 39-40.
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had with Wisconsin's judicial election system and stated: "For the
election of judges by popular vote there is nothing to be said. 169
Several factors influenced the Committee's conclusion that
Wisconsin's method of selecting judges was not serving the state well
and that a more effective alternative needed to be established. First,
Committee members were concerned that a judicial election system
minimized the potential pool of qualified judicial candidates because
qualified attorneys would be reluctant to leave their practices and enter
an unstable and unpredictable election.7 Second, the Committee
expressed concern about the increasing costs of judicial elections and
the resulting need for judicial candidates to collect campaign
contributions that could potentially threaten their independence as
judges.' Third, Committee members were concerned that judicial
elections slowed down the wheels of justice by requiring judges to spend
more time on the campaign trail than on the bench.",
C. The Role of the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court Election in the
Committee's Deliberations
In addition to the three factors mentioned above, the main impetus
behind judicial selection reform in Wisconsin was the Committee's
discontent over two ruinous elements of judicial elections that were
clearly displayed during the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court election: 1)
the increased politicization of judicial elections resulting from a lack of
substantive issues, and 2) the increased use of single issues and cases in
judicial elections.7 Although specific reference to Currie's defeat in the
1967 election did not appear in any of the Committee's materials, it is
axiomatic that Committee members were aware of, and influenced by,
the circumstances surrounding Currie's defeat in 1967.74
169. Id. at 42 (quoting Harold J. Laski, The Techniques of Judicial Appointment, 24
MICH. L. REV. 529, 531 (1926)).
170. See id. at 53.
171. Id. at 51.
172. See id. at 52.
173. Id. at 56.
174. The Committee materials and transcripts contain numerous implicit references to
Currie's defeat in the 1967 election. For example, one committee member asked a question
regarding the "problems encountered by elected judges when they are called upon to decide
'hot' issues which arouse the active interest of the community." SUMMARY TRANScRIPT,
supra note 167, at 5. Moreover, another committee member questioned a judge about the
impact of "community feelings" on judicial decisions. Id. at 7. Clearly, the Braves' departure
from Milwuakee was a hot issue sparking intense community feelings.
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1. The Politics of Judicial Elections
The Committee's Report stated that "[w]ithout issues [and] party
identification ... candidates for the bench must rely on their own
political resources .... [which] places a premium on their ability to act
out the political role."175 As the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court election
points out, the consequences of a "judge qua politician" can be
daunting.176 Although Currie was well versed in the law, it was obvious
that the erudite jurist lacked the necessary attributes of a successful
politician. A colleague of Currie's once remarked that he "was far from
being a charismatic personality" and noted that "he gave the impression
on the platform of ambivalence and unease."7 Hansen, on the other
hand, was the consummate politician; as an astute politician, he played
on voters' emotion by making the Braves departure an issue in the 1967
election and was successful in portraying Currie as the villain in this
drama.' It seems that Hansen's tactics were the type of "hijinks" that
Justice Hallows believed may consume those involved in a judicial
election. 9
2. The Use of Single Cases in Judicial Elections
The most revealing evidence that Currie's defeat in the 1967
Wisconsin Supreme Court election influenced the Committee can be
found in the following three references in the Committee's Report:
First, the Committee noted that "one of the most troublesome and
malignant consequences of judicial elections is the 'chilling effect' which
public opinion may exert on a judge's decisions in a particular case. ' so
Second, the Report highlighted the very real danger that decisions in
individual cases, although made in conformance with the law, may be
unpopular with the electorate and result in a judge's defeat at the
polls.'' Third, the Report cited with concern the results of a state-wide
175. CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at 49 (citing RAYMOND MOLEY,
TRIBUNES OF THE PEOPLE (1932)).
176. See id. at 49-53.
177. Heffernan, supra note 10, at 1033.
178. See Hansen Attacks, supra note 7, § 1, at 7.
179. Appointive Judges For Wisconsin Doubted, WIS. STATE J., May 25, 1972, §1, at 15.
(Magistrates occassionally indulge "in some hijinks ... that can only be construed as bids for
public attention and publicity in the press.").
180. CITIZENS STUDY REPORT, supra note 9, at 54.
181. Id. (noting that difficult decisions in the past have "resulted in defeat at the polls for
excellent judges who were required at the wrong time to make the right decisions") (citation
omitted).
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judicial survey that showed the second most frequently mentioned
major issue in judicial elections was a candidate's position on a specific
legal issue or case."
These three concerns of the Committee obviously summarized the
1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court election when an excellent judge by the
name of George Currie was required to defend the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's difficult decision in the Milwaukee Braves case. Currie and the
majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court made the correct, albeit
hugely unpopular decision that Wisconsin's antitrust laws had not been
violated. Unfortunately for Currie, this right decision was made at the
wrong time. The Braves case, more than any other issue in the 1967
election, resulted in the defeat of an excellent, incumbent justice at the
polls. Thus, it is clear that Currie's defeat in the 1967 Wisconsin
Supreme Court election was the principal factor in the Committee's
decision to abandon Wisconsin's judicial election system in favor of a
merit-based appointment system.
D. The Committee's Proposal to End Judicial Elections in Wisconsin
The Committee concluded that the ills associated with Wisconsin's
judicial election system could best be cured by adopting a more effective
merit-based appointment plan for selecting Wisconsin's judiciary." The
plan adopted by the Committee was largely based on the Missouri Plan
of 1940, the prototype for merit-based appointment systems, which had
been endorsed by numerous leading organizationsY4 A number of
states, moreover, adopted some form of merit selection." The version
of the Missouri Plan adopted by the Committee cast the governor as the
main player in nominating judicial candidates.8  Under the
Committee's plan, gubernatorial judicial nominees could only be
appointed to the bench after first being certified as qualified by a
182. l& at 47. It should be noted, however, that "70% of the 146 responding indicated
that there was no major issue in their last campaign." Id.
183. Id. at 56.
184. Id. at 61-62. Leading organizations that had endorsed merit selection of judges
included the American Bar Association, the Committee for Economic Development, the
American Judicature Society, the Institute for Judicial Administration, the National
Conference on the Judiciary, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. Id.
185. Id. at 60. States which had adopted a form of merit selection included Missouri,
Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Louisiana, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, Vermont,
Indiana, and Tennessee. Id.
186. Id. at 57-58.
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Commission on Judicial Qualifications."s The Committee's plan did
retain a vestige of past practice by allowing the electorate to remove
judges in exceptional circumstances."" However, in these judicial
elections, judges would not run against another candidate; rather, they
would run against their own record,"9 thus alleviating any concerns of a
repeat of the flawed judicial elections Wisconsin had seen in the past.
The virtues of the merit-based appointment plan proposed by the
Committee were seen as a remedy for the flaws associated with past
Wisconsin judicial elections including the 1967 Wisconsin Supreme
Court election.'O Under a merit-based appointment system, judicial
candidates would, to a great extent, be insulated from the type of
politicking associated with judicial elections, like the ability of a single
case to effect the election results, such as the Braves case. 9' The
Committee also believed that keeping politics out of judicial selections
would increase the pool of qualified candidates.'9 Merit-based
appointments would further eliminate less desirable aspects of judicial
elections, such as the increasing costs of judicial campaigns and the
appearance of impropriety associated with judicial candidates soliciting
campaign contributions."9 Although, above all, merit-based selection of
judges would permit a choice to be made "on the basis of a thorough
evaluation of those characteristics and qualities essential for a good
judge. 11194
E. Reaction to the Committee's Proposal
Reaction to the Committee's decision to abandon Wisconsin's
187. Id. at 56. The Commission on Judicial Qualifications was to be composed of three
members from each of the following: 1) representatives of the public appointed by the
governor; 2) judges appointed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court; and 3) attorneys elected by
the Wisconsin State Bar. Id. at 66.
188. i& at 64. The Committee established a rather complicated set of procedures that
would determine whether a judge could be subject to an election. Under the procedures, a
sitting judge could not be challenged by the electorate unless a petition carrying a number of
names equal to 15% of the votes for governor cast in the district in the previous election was
obtained. Further procedures stipulated that judges would not be subject to an election
during their first four years on the bench. Id.
189. Id. at 66.
190. See id. at 56. While the Report does not specifically mention the 1967 election, it
does assert that [t]he emphasis in [merit] selection is shifted from the political salability of a
candidate to his actual qualifications for office."
191. See id.
192 See id.
193. Id. at 56-57
194. Id. at 56.
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judicial election system in favor of a merit-based appointment system
was met with mixed results in Wisconsin. Chief Justice Hallows, a
special committee studying the selection of Wisconsin Supreme Court
justices, the past Wisconsin State Bar president, and the Milwaukee
Journal had all endorsed merit selection of judges even before the
Committee suggested such a plan for Wisconsin.195 Obviously these
parties, along with other segments of Wisconsin's population, were
enthused with the Committee's proposal to abandon judicial elections in
Wisconsin.
However, not all Wisconsinites shared the same level of enthusiasm
concerning the Committee's proposal to appoint judges. Among the
most vocal opponents of the Committee's proposal was organized labor.
The president of the Wisconsin AFL-CIO, John Schmitt, said the
Committee's proposal to appoint rather than elect judges "was a
snobbish insult to Wisconsin voters ... and represents a drastic step
backward for democratically controlled government in our state." '196 In
fact, labor members on the Committee felt so strongly about continuing
Wisconsin's system of an elected judiciary that they threatened to defeat
the whole judicial reform package.19 As an editorial cartoon indicated,
the Milwaukee Sentinel agreed, saying the Committee's plan "would
mute the voice of the public in judicial selection and place too much
power in the hands of a select few."' 98
In the end, those who favored judicial elections in Wisconsin
prevailed. The Committee's proposal to end judicial elections never
gained the necessary support of the Wisconsin State Legislature, and
merit-based appointment of judges fell by the wayside' 9
VII. CONCLUSION
In the end, what matters most is not that the Committee's proposal
for merit-based appointment of judges failed; rather, what matters the
most is why judicial selection became such a divisive policy issue in the
first place. The 1967 Wisconsin Supreme Court election provides the
answer. This election showcased how inherent flaws in Wisconsin's
judicial election system, and indeed in any judicial election system, can
195. Id. at 62-63.
196. Plan to Appoint Judges Termed 'Snobbish Insult,' MILWAUKEE J., Nov. 13,1972, pt.
1, at 1.
197. Heffernan, supra note 10, at 1041-42.
198. Elect Judges, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Nov. 7,1972, pt. 1, at 14.
199. Heffernan, supra note 10, at 1042.
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facilitate the defeat of an imminent, incumbent justice, like George
Curriek, for making the right decision at the wrong time.
The debate over judicial elections continues today. Recent
Wisconsin judicial elections have again raised public concern over
Wisconsin's method of judicial selection.2  This concern has led to
legislative action. Recently, legislation was introduced in the Wisconsin
State Assembly that would provide for state Senate confirmation of
gubernatorial judicial appointments1 Nevertheless, despite such
measures, it is safe to assume that Wisconsin will always have judicial
elections. However, as long as Wisconsin retains its judicial election
system, we as a state run the risk of repeating the results of the 1967
Wisconsin Supreme Court election-a consequence that some would say
is fatal.
200. Richard P. Jones, High Court Race Brings Reform Cries, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Apr. 8, 1999, available at http://www.jsonline.com/election99/news/0408supreme.asp (last
visited Sept. 18, 2001). The most notable example is the 1999 Wisconsin Supreme Court
election between incumbent Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson and challenger Sharon Rose.
In that election more than $1 million dollars was spent between the two candidates.
201. Wis. Assemb. J. Res. 63 (1999).
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